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HARMON V BROWNER: A FLAWED INTERPRETATION
OF EPA OVERFILING AUTHORITY?
I.

INTRODUCTION

To combat the environmental problems of the United States,
the federal environmental statutory scheme divides administrative
and enforcement powers between state and federal agencies.1 Congress empowers the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
through the major federal environmental statutes, to delegate enforcement authority to the states in order to carry out federal environmental goals. 2 Consequently, states play a lead role in
developing programs to enforce the nation's environmental laws,
while EPA oversees and authorizes such programs. 3 This statutory
4
scheme is typically referred to as cooperative federalism.
To ensure that state agencies adequately enforce our nation's
5
environmental laws, EPA instituted the practice of overfiling.
Overfiling occurs when EPA brings an enforcement action after a
state action has been filed or is underway. 6 This practice allows
EPA to undertake an enforcement action after EPA has delegated
such authority to the states. 7 Such practices have created frustrations between state and federal government.8 Much of this frustra1. See Christina Coop, Note, Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner, 28 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 253, 253 (2001) (splitting responsibilities of enforcement and administration
between state and federal agencies in response to past ineffective and inconsistent
attempts by states to address environmental problems).
2. See Lisa Dittman, Comment, Overfiling: Policy Arguments in Support of the Gorilla in the Closet, 48 UCLA L. REv. 375, 376 (2000) (referring to elements of federal
environmental statutory scheme as delegation of enforcement authority to states).
3. See id. (noting delegation to states because states have greater understanding of conditions and greater ease to implement programs addressing environmental problems).
4. See id. at 376-77 (defining cooperative federalism as delegation of enforcement authority to state by federal agency).
5. See Coop, supra note 1, at 253 (discussing use of overfiling to oversee state
enforcement of federal environmental laws and maintain consistency in compliance with federal statutes).
6. See id. at 255 (defining "overfiling" as practice of beginning enforcement
action after state action is underway).
7. See Major Cotell, No RCRA Double Jeopardy, 1999 ARMy LAW. 44, 44 (1999)
(defining overfiling practice under Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
[hereinafter RCRA]).
8. See Ellen R. Zahren, Comment, Overfiling Under Federalism:FederalNipping at
State Heels to Protect the Environment, 49 EMORY L.J. 373, 374 (2000). Generally, states
do not like federal power interrupting state's delegated powers over enforcement
programs. Id.

(179)
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tion stems from the challenge of striking the appropriate balance of
authority between EPA and state agencies in the implementation of
federal environmental law. 9 States argue that EPA overfiling authority is not permissible under environmental statutes.' 0 Although
major environmental statutes like the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the
Clean Water Act (CWA) seem to allow EPA overfiling, other statutes, such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),
are not clear as to whether such practices are permissible. 1
Harmon v. Browner highlights the frustrations surrounding
overfiling practices under RCRA. 12 In Harmon, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals reviewed whether overfiling was permissible
under RCRA and concluded that such practices were impermissible
under this Act.' 3 Since this decision, several federal courts reexamined this issue and found flaws in the Eighth Circuit's decision,
finding EPA overfiling practices permissible under RCRA as well as
other federal environmental statutes.14
This Note focuses on the criticisms of the Eighth Circuit's Harmon v. Browner decision. Part Two of this Note describes the facts
and procedural history of Harmon.15 Part Three examines the implications and debate surrounding overfiling under CWA, CAA and
9. See Coop, supra note 1, at 255 (addressing that there is debate between state
and federal agencies regarding balance of authority in administrative and enforcement responsibility between state and federal Environmental Protection Agency
[hereinafter EPA]).
10. See id. ("Many state agencies and members of the regulated community
contest EPA's interpretation that most environmental statues provide for
overfiling.").
11. See Bryan S. Miller, UnderstandingOverfiling: The Impact of Two Recent Federal
Cases of EPA Overfiling, 15J. ENvrL. L. & LITIG. 21, 21-22 (2000) ("Although some
federal statutes seem to allow for overfiling, others are less clear.").
12. See id. at 25 (asserting that Harmon v. Browneris first federal case to directly
address issue of overfiling under RCRA).
13. See Harmon Indus. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 895 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding
once state is authorized EPA is precluded from bringing enforcement action
under federal environmental law to administer hazardous waste program).
14. See United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1060-61
(D.Colo. 2000) (holding EPA action was not precluded by state's enforcement action and resjudicata did not bar claim), affd, 2002 WL 2017134 (10th Cir. 2002);
see also United States v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1060-61 (W.D.
Wis. 2001) (concluding EPA was not precluded from its RCRA claims by pending
state action); see also United States v. LTV Steel Co., Inc., 118 F. Supp. 2d 827, 828
(N.D. Ohio 2000) (settling city air pollution charges under Clean Air Act [hereinafter CAA] did not preclude plaintiff from suing for additional penalties under fed
law); see also United States v. Youngstown, 109 F. Supp. 2d 739, 740 (N.D. Ohio
2000) (finding EPA enforcement authority under Clean Water Act [hereinafter
CWA) was not precluded because enforcement authority granted to statute).
15. For a discussion of the facts of Harmon v. Browner, see infra notes 19-35
and accompanying text.
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RCRA. 'a The Eighth Circuit's reasoning for prohibiting overfiling
practices is discussed in Part Four and Part Five reviews and critiques weaknesses in the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of EPA
overfiling practices. 17 Finally, Part Six focuses on the practical
repercussions the Harmon holding will have on future environmental enforcement actions.' 8
II.

FACTS

Harmon Industries, a manufacturer of safety equipment for
railroads, operated a plant in Grain Valley, Missouri. 19 In 1973,
Harmon Industries began to discard volatile solvent residue and
continued to do so for 14 years, until November 1987.2) After discovering that the corporation had discarded solvent residue behind
Harmon's Grain Valley Plant, plant management notified the Missouri Department of Natural Resources (MDNR).21 Following the
state agency's investigation of Harmon's disposal practices, MDNR
concluded that Harmon's past disposal did not pose a threat to
22
human health and the environment.
MDNR and Harmon Industries worked together to develop a
23
plan to clean up the area affected by Harmon's past disposals.
While developing this plan, Harmon Industries requested that
MDNR refrain from imposing civil penalties for the past disposal
practices. 24 Because Harmon Industries voluntarily reported its environmental violations and fully cooperated with all aspects of the
16. For a discussion of the background of overfiling under CWA, CAA, and
RCRA, see infra notes 36-116 and accompanying text.
17. For a narrative analysis of Harmon v. Browner, see infra notes 117-69 and
accompanying text, and for a critical analysis of the decision see infra notes 170225 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the impact the Harmon decision may have on future
environmental enforcement actions, see infra notes 225-69 and accompanying text.
19. See Harmon Indus. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 896 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting
plant in Missouri is used to assemble circuitry boards for rail road controls and
safety).
20. See id. at 896-97 (discarding solvent residue for fourteen years where management was unaware of such practice).
21. See id. at 897. In Harmon, the personnel manager filed a report to the
Missouri Department of Natural Resources [hereinafter MDNR] after discovering
maintenance worker routinely discarded volatile solvent residue. Id.
22. See id. at 897 (investigating disposal activities after Harmon voluntarily
contacted state agency).
23. See id. (discussing drafting of comprehensive compliance plan to clean tip
disposal area).
24. See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 897. Harmon Industries had made the request
that no penalties be made while MDNR and Harmon cooperatively developed a
clean up plan. Id.
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investigation, MDNR agreed to release Harmon from any monetary
penalties.2 5 Subsequently, the Missouri state court entered a consent decree between MDNR and Harmon, acknowledging Harmon's cooperation with environmental law and releasing Harmon
26
from monetary penalties.
While Harmon Industries worked with the state agency to develop and implement the remediation plan, EPA filed an administrative enforcement action against Harmon, seeking monetary
penalties for RCRA violations. 27 While the EPA's administrative action was pending, the state court issued the consent decree. 28 EPA
pursued the enforcement action and successfully litigated the fed29
eral enforcement action through the administrative process.
Soon thereafter, Harmon filed a complaint challenging the administrative decision in the Western District Court of Missouri."3
That court reversed the administrative court's decision to allow EPA
overfiling.3 ' The district court granted summary judgment to Harmon Industries, holding that EPA could not impose civil penalties.32 The district court found the practice of overfiling
impermissible under RCRA, contravening principles of res judicata.33 EPA appealed the district court decision to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 34 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the grant of
summary judgment and dismissed the action, holding that once
EPA authorized a state to administer and enforce a hazardous waste
25. See id. Following the investigation by MDNR, Harmon Industries willingly
worked with MDNR to clean up the disposal area. Id.

26. See id. (entering decree to acknowledge that Harmon was working with
MDNR to full accord and satisfaction).
27. See id. at 897 (seeking $2,343,706 in penalties in enforcement action
against Harmon).
28. See id. On March 5, 1993 the Missouri state court judge approved the
consent decree that MDNR and Harmon entered into while the EPA administrative enforcement action was pending. Id.
29. See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 897 (litigating before administrative law judge
where penalty against Harmon was found to be appropriate and was affirmed by
Environmental Appeals Board panel).
30. See id. On June 6, 1997, Harmon filed a complaint in federal district court
to challenge the Environmental Appeals Board's decision to affirm the administrative judge's decision. Id.
31. See id. (granting defenses request for summary judgment).
32. See id. The district court favored Harmon's argument and reversed the
administrative appellate court decision to find EPA overfiling permissible under
RCRA. Id.
33. See id. (holding that EPA was precluded from brining enforcement action
against Harmon thereby finding overfiling impermissible).
34. See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 897 (appealing summary judgment decision of
district court).
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program, an enforcement action brought by the state precluded
35
EPA from assigning its own penalty.
III.

A.

BACKGROUND

Federal Statutory Environmental Scheme: CAA, CWA and
RCRA

Congress enacted CAA, CWA and RCRA in the 1970's in response to the ineffective and inconsistent attempts by states to address environmental problems. 36 Under each of these statutes, EPA
and the states attempt to work cooperatively to deliver a national
enforcement system that protects the nation's environmental and
public health concerns. 3 7 The main goal of environmental protection laws is deterrence. 38 To fulfill this goal, the federal government permits states to implement environmental programs and to
enforce federal environmental laws.3 9 States enforce federal environmental laws by adopting and administering their own adaptation of federal laws. 40 Under this cooperative federalism scheme,
EPA maintains a supervisory role over state enforcement of federal
environmental law to ensure that there is uniformity in compliance
41
with federal environmental statutes.
The three major environmental statutes, CAA, CWA and
42
RCRA, delegate federal environmental standards to the states.
These statutes encourage states to promulgate programs and imple35. See id. at 896-97 (upholding lower court's decision finding overfiling
under RCRA impermissible).
36. See Coop, supra note 1, at 253 (asserting reasoning behind Congress's enactment of CAA, CWA and RCRA).
37. See David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a
"Reinvented"State/FederalRelationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV.
ENvTrL. L. REv. 1, 33 (2000) (describing partnership role of states and federal government in administering and enforcing federal environmental laws).
38. See Amy E. Jolley, Comment, Scaring the States Into Submission? Divergent
Approaches to Environmental Compliance, 35 TULSA L.J. 193, 195 (1999) (noting primary goal of federal statutes is to deter commission of environmental violations).
39. See Jerry Organ, Environmental Federalism Part II: The Impact of Harmon,
Smithfield and Clean on Overfiling under RCRA, the CWA and the CAA, 30 ENV'TL. L.
REP. 10732, 10732 (2000) (asserting states are delegated authority to administer
most environmental programs).
40. See Markell, supra note 37, at 35. The states perform their role as a partner with the federal system to implement their version of environmental law. Id.
41. See Dittman, supra note 2, at 377-78 (delegating enforcement authority to
states which have primary enforcement role but EPA oversees).
42. See Zahren, supra note 8, at 378 (maintaining that under CAA, CWA and
RCRA Congress gave authority to states and federal government in administrating
and enforcing environmental statutes).
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ment federal environmental standards. 43 EPA approves and authorizes such programs, generally overseeing the enforcement and
44
implementation of these programs.
1. An Overview of CAA
Under CAA, states have the primary responsibility for the air
quality within their states. 45 CAA developed National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (NAAQS), which established uniform federal air

quality standards for sources of hazardous air pollution. 46 Under
this statute, states develop environmental programs, or State Implementation Plans (SIPs), which detail how the state will implement
NAAQS. 47 The state then reports the SIP to EPA for authorization
and approval. 48 Once approved, the state has the authority to enact
the program to enforce NAAQS. 49 If a SIP is inadequate, EPA has
discretion to assume enforcement authority. 511 Section 7413(a) (4)
of 42 U.S.C. provides: "No order issued under this subsection shall
prevent the State or the Administrator from assessing any penalties
nor otherwise affect or limit the State's or the United States authority to enforce under other provisions of this chapter .... ,,51
CAA also implemented a national permit program under Title
V of the Act. 52 Sources releasing pollutants into the air are subject
to the permit program and are required to have a permit. 53 The
permits provide emission limitations and compliance standards that
43. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000); Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6942 (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 74017671 (2000).
44. See Zahren, supra note 8, at 383 (summarizing generally enforcement actions under each of three regulatory statutes).
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (a) (3) (1994) (providing that "air pollution prevention ... and ... control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local
governments ....").
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (affording guidelines for states and requiring that
EPA adopt uniform emission standards for sources of air pollutants).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) (developing plans to attain National Ambient Air
Quality Standards [hereinafter NAAQS] and other requirements of CAA).
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)-(b) (noting EPA will approve and fund State Implementation Plans [hereinafter SIPs] if statutory requirements are met).
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (maintaining each SIP becomes codified in Code
of Federal Regulations).
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (2) (outlining enforcement authority if state fails
to enforce SIP or permit program).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (4) (allowing state and EPA to impose penalties or
enforce other provisions of CAA after order has been filed).
52. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661a-7661h (describing permit programs under CAA).
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661 b (outlining permit application process under CAA).
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sources cannot violate.5 4 States are responsible for the administration and enforcement of the permit program. 55 If states fail to accomplish the goals of CAA's permit program, however, EPA may
exercise its enforcement authority. 56 Section 7661a(e) provides
that "nothing in this subsection should be construed to limit the
' '5 7
Administrator's ability to enforce permits issued by a State.
2.

An Overview of CWA

The goal of CWA is to restore and maintain the nation's waters. 58 This Act mandates that states control the discharges of pollutants into the country's waters. 59 CWA regulates pollutant
discharge through a permit system, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) .60 The states play a primary
role in the implementation of this permit system. 6' Similar to CAA,
under CWA, EPA delegates enforcement and implementation powers to the states so long as the state permit programs are equivalent
to what federal law would provide. 62 EPA has also retained enforcement powers under CWA to correct inadequate state action. 63 Section 1342(i) provides that, "[n]othing in this section shall be
construed to limit the authority of the Administrator to take action
pursuant to section 1319 of the title .... ,64 Section 1319 allows

54. See id. (providing that it shall be unlawful to violate requirements of issued

permit). Section 7661c provides for the establishing of permit requirements and
conditions according to the national permit program of Title V under CAA. See 42

U.S.C. § 7661c.
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b), (d) (2000) (setting out that states promulgate
regulations under permit program and monitor issuance of permits).
56. See 42 U.S.C. §7661a(e) (establishing that EPA can suspend issuance of
permits and have jurisdiction to administer and enforce federally issued permits).
57. Id. (referring to EPA's enforcement powers over states under permit
program).
58. See 33 U.S.C § 1251(b) (2000) (restoring and maintaining chemical, bio-

logical and physical integrity of nation's waters).
59. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000) (submitting proposal to EPA allows states
to take over permit process to monitor discharges).
60. See id. (providing that EPA "shall" approve of state program so long as
state met requirement under CWA).
61. See 33 U.S.C. § 1318(c) (describing state's primary role over federal
agency in enforcing CWA).
62. See id. (detailing enforcement role of state and federal government).
63. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(2) (giving EPA authority to enforce any permit

condition or limitation if EPA believes state failed to enforce permit conditions or
limitations effectively).
64. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(i) (clarifying EPA's enforcement powers).
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186

EPA to issue a compliance order or to commence a civil action

65
whenever any person is in violation of a permit.

3. An Overview of RCRA
RCRA addresses problems posed by hazardous waste and attempts to reduce the threat hazardous waste poses to human health
and the environment. 6 6 RCRA identifies hazardous chemical wastes

and imposes regulatory requirements for dealing with such hazardous waste. 67 Similar to CWA and CAA, RCRA contains a permit system allowing a state to apply to EPA for authorization to administer
and enforce a hazardous waste program. 68 Section 6926 prescribes
RCRA's permit system, providing that EPA may authorize a state
hazardous waste program where the state program operates "in lieu
of' the federal program. 69 Under section 6926, the state must administer and implement a program that is equivalent to the federal
program, providing adequate compliance and enforcement measures.70 RCRA also includes a notice requirement, section 6928,
which allows EPA to bring an enforcement action after giving the
71
states adequate notice.
B.

Overfiling Practices under the Federal Environmental
Statutory Scheme

Since the enactment of CAA, CWA and RCRA, nearly thirty
years ago, EPA has used overfiling practices as a means of enforcement. 72 Overfiling practices entail commencing an enforcement
65. See 33 U.S.C § 1319(b). EPA may bring a "civil action for appropriate relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction" for violations which authorized to issue compliance order under section 1319(a). See id.
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (2000). The goal of RCRA is to address problems
posed by hazardous waste and the role of state is to reduce its threat. 42 U.S.C.

§ 6902.
67. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6924 (defining hazardous wastes and summarizing
means of dealing with such wastes).
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (describing permit system under RCRA that encourages primary state role in enforcement); see also Coop, supra note 1, at 256 (reiterating states' primary role in enforcement actions).
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b). EPA may withdraw authorization if the state enforcement action is inadequate. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e).
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b). The state enforcement action has the "same
force and effect" as a federal action. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(d).
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (1)-(2). Unlike the CAA and CWA, RCRA does not
assign a specific number of days for giving notice to the state. Id.; see also Zahren,
supra note 8, at 382 (comparing notice requirement of CAA and CWA with RCRA).
72. See Zahren, supra note 8, at 373 (noting that after thirty years of federal
environmental regulation, environmental problems still require strong federal
enforcement).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol14/iss1/7

8

Zeft: Harmon v. Browner: A Flawed Interpretation of EPA Overfiling Auth

20031

EPA

OVERFILING

action after a state enforcement action is underway.7 3 Although
EPA overfiles in very few instances, EPA will overfile in the following cases: when a state penalty is not sufficient, when a state is not
taking timely action or when a state is taking inadequate action
against a violator of federal environmental laws. 74 Thus, the practice of overfiling responds to violations of environmental laws and
instances when a state environmental program fails to adequately
75
protect human health and the environment.
Though EPA uses overfiling to ensure adequate enforcement
of environmental law, states have resisted the practice. 76 Environmental statutes give states primary responsibility in enforcement actions. 77 States contend that overfiling by the federal government
infringes upon its enforcement role. 78 States argue that federal en-

forcement actions interfere with state autonomy; and overfiling
takes away from a state's authority to implement and enforce environmental objectives. 79 Additionally, states argue that overfiling is
a wasteful practice creating duplicative enforcement. 80 Critics of
overfiling speculate that "[i] f the EPA stopped overfiling and spent
those resources on other compliance matters, perhaps more enforcement would occur and costs would be saved." 8 1

73. See Miller, supra note 11, at 21-22 (defining "overfiling" as practice of beginning enforcement action after state action is underway).
74. SeeJolley, supra note 38, at 207 (noting EPA overfiled in 1992 and 1993 in
about thirty cases and from 1994 to 1996 there were only twenty-two instances of
overfiling); see also Zahren, supra note 8, at 373 ("Overfiling occurs when the EPA
either steps in to fix, change, undo, or add to what a state has already done or
takes action after a state has failed to act.").
75. SeeJolley supra note 38 (overfiling occurs when state response fails to deter future violations or protect law abiding facilities).
76. See Zahren, supra note 8, at 373 (noting that states argue federal overfiling
authority should not exist at all).
77. See id. The federal government retains some oversight and enforcement
authority, but it is secondary to state enforcement authority. Id.
78. See id. at 411 (viewing overfiling practices as "unjustified interference"
with state authority).
79. See id. at 429 (stating overfiling undermines state authority to carry out
federal environmental laws).
80. See id. at 429-30 (describing state criticism of overfiling practices as duplicative, undermining certainty, efficiency and state authority, thereby creating
waste).
81. Zahren, supra note 8, at 429-30 (asserting that valuable resources are
wasted on overfiling).
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Case Law Addressing the Issue of Overfiling Using the
Harmon Overfiling Analysis

The Eighth Circuit's decision in Harmon v. Browner illustrates
the ongoing tensions surrounding the issue of overfiling. 82 Prior to
the Harmon decision, EPA claimed it had the authority under RCRA
to overfile. 8 3 The Harmon court undermined this position when it
found such overfiling practices impermissible. 8 4 Although the administrative courts in Harmon found EPA overfiling permissible, the
district court and Eighth Circuit reversed the administrative court's
ruling, resting their decisions on the statutory interpretation of the
85
language and principles of res judicata.
The Eighth Circuit analyzed EPA's interpretation of RCRA
overfiling through the statutory analysis developed in Chevron U.S.A
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc.86 In Chevron, the Supreme Court held that deference must be given to EPA's interpretation when the legislative history or meaning of a statute is
ambiguous as to a specific issue.8 7 Applying this standard, the
Eighth Circuit analyzed the ambiguity of the RCRA language pertaining to overfiling practices and concluded that RCRA did not
permit overfiling.8 8 The Harmon court did not defer to EPA's interpretation of overfiling under RCRA. 89 According to the Eighth Cir82. See David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role.
of Rational Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 937 (asserting
that EPA dedication to rational polluter model has caused ongoing fight with
states over enforcement actions that are not on par with EPA's policy).
83. See Miller, supra note 11, at 22 (maintaining that first federal case to address overfiling was Harmon v. Browner).
84. See id. at 27. Prior to Harmon, EPA thought it had free authority under
RCRA to overfile. Id. The Harmon decision greatly limited this position. Id.
85. See Harmon Indus. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 897 (8th Cir. 1999) (reversing
administrative court decision that found EPA monetary penalty permissible).
86. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984) (asserting that when legislative history of statute is silent to instant issue,
EPA or agency interpretation must be deferred to).
87. See id. at 843-45.
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill there is an expressed delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation ....

We have long recognized that

considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's
construction of a statutory scheme is entrusted to administer, and the
principle of deference to administration interpretations.
Id.
88. See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 897. To determine whether overfiling practices
were permissible under RCRA the Eighth Circuit court used the Chevron standard
to review the correctness of the EPA's interpretation of RCRA to allow such practices. Id.
89. See id. at 901 (holding there was no support in RCRA's text or legislative
history to find EPA overfiling practices permissible).
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cuit, the plain language meaning of RCRA's section 6926
authorized state regulations to supplant those of the federal government.90 The court also concluded that, the notice requirement
found in section 6928 of RCRA gives the states a primary role in
enforcement, thereby precluding EPA overfiling. 9'
Further, the court read RCRA's statutory language as establish92
ing a privity relationship between the state and federal agency.

According to the court, the state agency and federal agency were in
a privity relationship, having a "close relationship bordering on
near identity."9 3 Having found a privity relationship between the
state and federal agencies, the court determined that the doctrine
94
of res judicata precluded overfiling.
Following the Harmon decision, several federal courts found
flaws in the Eighth Circuit's analysis of RCRA overfiling. In United
States v. Power Engineering, the District Court of Colorado disregarded the Harmon court's analysis and adopted EPA's interpretation of RCRA and overfiling practices. 95 Recently, the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the District Court of Colorado's decision, finding
EPA overfiling practices under RCRA permissible. 9 6 The Western
District of Wisconsin came to a similar decision in United States v.
Murphy Oil, also finding flaws in the Harmon court's interpretation
97
of overfiling under RCRA.
Power Engineering,like Harmon, entailed a state environmental
agency seeking to force defendants to comply with orders under
90. See id. at 899 (stating § 6926 of RCRA "in lieu of' language authorizes that
state enforcement actions supplant EPA enforcement actions).
91. See id. (noting that § 6928 reinforces primacy of state right to enforce
under RCRA).
92. See id. at 903 (referring to § 6926(b) "in lieu of" language and § 6926(b)
"same force and effect" language as establishing grounds for privity relationship or
nearly identical relationship).
93. Harmon, 191 F.3d at 903 (citing United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188,

1197 (8th Cir. 1994)).
94. See id. (maintaining that Missouri's action was in lieu of EPA action and
had same force and effect as EPA action; thus, privity relationship is established
where EPA is precluded to put forth same legal right under RCRA as state under
doctrine of res judicata).
95. See United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1057 (D.Colo.
2000) (finding EPA interpretation of RCRA correct in allowing overfiling).
96. See United States v. Power Eng' Co., 303 F.3d 1232, 1236-40 (10th Cir. 2002)
(deferring to EPA interpretation that RCRA permits EPA overfiling and that
overfiling is not barred by resjudicata principles).
97. See Power Engg, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1065 (ruling that overfiling under
RCRA by EPA was permissible, insisting Eight Circuit misinterpreted RCRA); see
also United States v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1054 (W.D. Wis.
2001).
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RCRA.981 EPA in Power Engineeringfiled an enforcement action to
seek financial assurance from the defendants when the state agency
failed to do so. 99 While the defendants argued that Harmon precluded EPA from overfiling under RCRA, the court determined
that RCRA did not prohibit the plaintiffs action, and the court deferred to EPA's interpretation of RCRA. l0° ° Adopting EPA's interpretation, the district court in Power Engineering referred to the
statutory language found in section 6928's notice requirement as
evidence that RCRA allowed EPA to institute enforcement actions
after providing notice to the states."" Additionally, the Colorado
district court did not find a privity relationship between the state
agency and EPA; therefore, the court reasoned that overfiling did
1 2
not go against principles of res judicata. 0
Similar to the PowerEngineeringcourt, the District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin in Murphy Oil found overfiling a permissible practice under RCRA. 10 3 Like the district court in Power
Engineering,the district court in Murphy Oil held that EPA overfiling
practices were permissible, interpreting RCRA to allow EPA enforcement actions when a state enforcement action was already underway. 10 4 The Murphy Oil court deferred to EPA's interpretation
of RCRA to permit overfiling, reading the Act as allowing EPA en5
forcement actions so long as EPA gave notice to the state. 1'
98. See Murphy Oil, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1054 (charging defendant with treating,
storing and disposing of hazardous wastes without proper state and federal
permits).
99. See id. (asserting that state agency, Colorado Department of Public Health
and Environment, failed to demand financial assurance even though EPA requested financial assurance enforcement).
100. See id. at 1116 (quoting Power Eng'g, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (D. Colo.
2000)). The Tenth Circuit "assumed without deciding . . . that the EPA may
[overfile] even after the state has taken its own enforcement actions." Id.
101. See Power Eng'g, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1062-63 (refusing to disregard regulations found in 40 C.F.R §271.16(c) and 40 C.F.R § 271.19 to determine EPA's interpretation of RCRA and power to overfile). The district court agreed with
Harmon's interpretation of section 6926. Id. According to the district court, section 6926 of RCRA demonstrated that Congress intended the states to have a lead
role in enforcement; this, however, did not indicate that EPA was unable to
overfile. Id.
102. See id. at 1062. Additionally, the Colorado court's reading of section
6926 did permit EPA overfiling in enforcement actions. Id.
103. See Murphy Oil, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1017 (finding that federal agency was
not precluded from bringing enforcement action under RCRA by pending state
action concerning same violations).
104. See id. at 1054 (finding EPA not precluded from bringing enforcement
action under RCRA by pending state action concerning same violations).
105. See id. at 1117. The court found RCRA to be ambiguous and as per Chevron, the court deferred to EPA interpretation of RCRA to allow overfiling as "a
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute." Id.
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Courts have also addressed whether the Harmon analysis under
RCRA applies to overfiling actions under CWA and CAA.10 6 In addition to addressing overfiling practices under RCRA, the court in
Murphy Oil also addressed the Harmon analysis of overfiling as it pertained to CAA. 10 7 The defendant in Murphy Oil violated CAA and
argued that the Harmon reasoning and principles of res judicata
barred EPA from overfiling under CAA. 10 8 Nevertheless, the court
read the statutory language of CAA to permit overfiling and declined application of Harmon's overfiling analysis to CAA enforcement actions. 10 9
The Northern District Court of Ohio in United States v. Youngstown and United States v. LTV Steel Co. has also declined application

of Harmon's overfiling reasoning to CWA and CAA violations. 11 0
The district court in Youngstown rejected the argument that the
Harmon reasoning should be applied to violations of CWA. 1 ' In
Youngstown, a state action against the city for CWA violations did
not preclude EPA from bringing an enforcement action. 112 The
City of Youngstown argued that CWA paralleled RCRA, which
would preclude an EPA enforcement action under the Harmon
106. See id. (determining EPA overfiling practices were not precluded under
CAA); see also, United States v. LTV Steel Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 827, 829 (N.D. Ohio
2000) (permitting EPA overfiling practices under CAA); see also United States v.
Youngstown, 109 F. Supp. 2d 739, 739 (N.D. Ohio) (finding EPA could overfile
under CWA).
107. See Murphy Oil 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1089-91. In Murphy Oil, plaintiff argued that CAA's statutory scheme did not bar the federal government from overfiling against a violator of the Act. Id. Conversely, the defendant argued that the
plaintiff was barred from bringing its CAA claims because the defendant had settled a suit with the state to address the same violation. Id. The defendant based its
argument on principles of res judicata and relied on Harmon to support its argument. Id.
108. See id. at 1117. The defendant argued that under terms of settlement,
they were released from liability for its CAA violations. Id. This settlement barred
plaintiff from further proceedings. Id.
109. See id. (concluding Harmon reasoning did not apply to CAA enforcement
actions since CAA did not contain language that Eighth Circuit relied on to reach
decision and further interpreted Congress anticipated overfiling under CAA).
110. See LTV Steel Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d at 829 (maintaining settlement of state
claim of city air pollution charges did not preclude federal government from suing
for additional penalties); see also Youngstown, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 739 (stating EPA
enforcement authority was not taken away because enforcement authority to state
agency was allowed under CWA).
111. See Youngstown, 109 F. Supp. 2d. at 741 (noting defendant exclusively
relied on Harmon decision to argue EPA was barred from pursuing enforcement
action separate from state action).
112. See id. (reviewing violations of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System [hereinafter NPDES] permits under CWA and EPA's ability to bring enforcement after state brings such action).
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analysis.' l The Ohio court disagreed, finding major differences in
language contained in the enforcement provisions of the two statutes.1 14 The Ohio district court came to a similar decision in LTV
Steel, where the court determined that language in CAA also permitted overfiling. 115 The LTV Steel court determined that EPA was permitted to seek penalties from violators of CAA who have settled with
the local enforcement agency.' 16
IV.

NARRATivE ANALYSIS

The Eighth Circuit in Harmon examined both the statutory language of RCRA and the principles of res judicata to conclude that
EPA did not have the right to overfile its action against Harmon
Industries." l7 The Eighth Circuit, in a unanimous decision, found
EPA's enforcement action both duplicative and impermissible.' l 1
The Harmon court based its decision on statutory interpretation and
preclusion principles.'19
EPA argued that RCRA permitted the agency to file an enforcement action after authorizing a state action. 12 ' The state
agency claimed that a federal enforcement action was impermissible once EPA authorized a state enforcement action under

113. See id. (maintaining similarities between enforcement provision of CWA
and RCRA).
114. See id. Relying on Harmon was inappropriate since it involved RCRA
which contains "in lieu of" language that CWA did not contain. See id.
115. LTVSteel, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 832 (reviewing authority of EPA to overfile
where manufacturer was charged with violating city's air pollution code and settled
with City of Cleveland).
116. See id. (asserting that "Ohio EPA's lack of involvement in LTV's settlement with the City of Cleveland negates all of LTV's argument regarding the
preclusive effect of an Ohio EPA settlement on EPA enforcement action.").
117. Harmon Indus. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 902-04 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding
that RCRA precluded EPA from assessing its own penalty against Harmon in these
circumstances).
118. See id. at 896 (affirming decision of district court that granted summary
judgment in favor of Harmon and reversed decision of administrative courts).
119. See id. at 898-904 (referring generally to review of federal agency's interpretation of statute and res judicata standards under Missouri law).
120. See id. at 898. The EPA argued that the lower court's interpretation of
RCRA was against the plain language meaning of the statute. Id.; see also Miller,
supra note 11, at 26 (stating EPA's main argument was that RCRA statutory language permitted overfiling).
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RCRA. 12 1 Both EPA and Harmon asserted that their interpretation
22
of the statute was correct.
EPA contended that the language of section 6928 allowed the
federal government to initiate an enforcement action under
RCRA. 123 The statute provides that "states [are] authorized to carry
out [hazardous waste programs] in lieu of the Federal program
under this subsection and to issue and enforce permits."' 24 According to EPA, "in lieu of' referred to which regulations were to be
enforced in an authorized state and did not refer to who was responsible for enforcing the regulations. 25 Additionally, EPA argued that RCRA should be interpreted as a whole, authorizing
states and EPA to enforce state regulations in compliance with
26

EPA's policies. 1

The Eighth Circuit analyzed RCRA using the Chevron standard
of review, considering the congressional intent behind RCRA and
EPA's interpretation of the statute. 127 Under this analysis, a court
must first ask whether Congress's intent was clear.1 28 If the statutory language clearly evinces the intent of Congress, the court must
adopt the legislative interpretation of the law. 129 If the court finds
the interpretation ambiguous, the court must then defer to the
121. See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 899. Harmon argued that RCRA's plain language supported its interpretation of the Act. Id.; see also Miller, supra note 11, at
26 (summarizing that state agency in Harmon analyzed statute to prohibit overfiling once federal agency approved of enforcement program).
122. See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 899 (noting that both parties argued that plain
language of statute supports their position).
123. See id. According to EPA, section 6928(a) (1) of RCRA provides that EPA
may "initiate enforcement actions against suspected environmental violators." Id.
However, section 6928(a) (2) permits EPA to enforce hazardous waste laws tinder
RCRA if EPA gives the state written notice. Id.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (2000) (authorizing state issuance of permits for
treatment storage and disposal of hazardous wastes).
125. See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 898 (explaining EPA contends that plain language allows enforcement action under § 6928 and that district court misinterpreted "in lieu" of language of § 6928).
126. See id. (according to EPA, RCRA authorizes either state or EPA enforcement of state regulation to comply with EPA standards). In addition, EPA argued
that the "same force and effect" language in section 6926(d) referred to the effect
of state issued permits. Id.
127. See id. at 897 (asserting Chevron standard of review for statutory interpretation looking to the legislative intent of the statute before deferring to EPA interpretation); see also, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
84245 (1984) (stating that court must give deference to agency interpretation, if
legislative history is silent to meaning of statute).
128. See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 897 (referring to Chevron, standard to determine
correctness of EPA interpretation of RCRA).
129. See id. (describing holding in Chevron to first consider legislative intent
before differing to agency interpretation where statute silent on issue).
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agency's interpretation of the statute.1 30 The Eighth Circuit rejected EPA's statutory interpretation because the court deemed it

inconsistent with RCRA's plain language and the legislative intent
of the statute.13 1 The Eighth Circuit maintained that "[w]hile the
EPA is correct that the 'in lieu of' language refers to the program

itself, the administration and enforcement of the program are inexorably intertwined."' 3

2

The Eighth Circuit explained that using the

words "in lieu of' in section 6926(b) evidenced that Congress intended the state program to supplant the federal program in all
respects.' 33 The fact that EPA could repeal an inadequate state enforcement program supported this interpretation. 34 The Harmon
court read such language to mean that EPA had secondary enforcement powers and could only begin an enforcement action after first
repealing state authorization. 13 5 According to the court, EPA's authorization of a state enforcement action was granted "in lieu of' a
13 6
federal government hazardous waste program.
To further support this interpretation of RCRA, the Court ex37
amined the "same force and effect" language of section 6926(d).
According to the Eighth Circuit, Congress intended to give the
states a role in enforcing hazardous waste programs. 3 Referring
to the House Reports, the Eighth Circuit noted that the House of
Representatives wanted to vest primary enforcement of hazardous

130. See id. (examining clarity and legislative intent of statute with regard to
EPA interpretation of RCRA). For a further discussion of Chevron, see supra notes
86-92 and accompanying text.
131. See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 899-900 (disagreeing with EPA claim that district
court incorrectly interpreted "in lieu of' and "same force and effect language").
132. Id. at 899 (believing RCRA allows states to receive authorization from
federal government to administer and enforce program that is to operate "in lieu
of" EPA regulatory program).
133. See id. (holding legislative intent of Congress to give state primary role to
authorize program and enforce under RCRA).
134. See id. Referring to section 6926(b), the Harmon court provides that "the
statute permits the EPA to repeal a state's authorization if the state's program
'does not provide adequate enforcement of compliance with the requirements of'
the RCRA." Id.
135. See id. (insisting language in § 6928(a) (] )and (2) when read with language in § 6926(b) demonstrates that EPA has secondary enforcement right since
EPA has right to withdraw state authorization if state enforcement is inadequate).
136. See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 899 (determining that Congress intended EPA to
have enforcement rights after state action rescinded or state fails to enforce action
adequately).
137. See id. (maintaining that "same force and effect" language provides support for states to play lead role in RCRA enforcement).
138. See id. at 899-901 (noting that congressional intent is found in language
of § 6926(b), § 6928(a)(1)and(2) and House reports).
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waste programs with the states. 139 Using the words "same force and
effect" in section 6926(d) indicated that the states had a primary
enforcement role under RCRA. 140 The Eighth Circuit dismissed
EPA's argument that "same force and effect" rested with the state's
permits because the words appeared under a heading entitled "Effect of State permit."1 '4 1 The Eighth Circuit determined that any
action taken by the state had the "same force and effect" as any
action taken by EPA. 142 According to the Eighth Circuit, "any action" under the 6926(d) provision applied to any state enforcement
143
action.
The Harmon court found that the notice requirement of section 6928 further supported EPA's role as a secondary enforcer and
the state's role as a primary enforcer.1 44 According to the Eighth
Circuit, the notice requirement of section 6928 reinforced the primary role of state enforcement.1 4 5 The notice requirement operated as a means to allow the state the first opportunity to initiate the
enforcement action. 14'6 The court found that section 6928 only allowed EPA to enforce the hazardous waste laws of RCRA if the
agency first gave written notice to the states. 147 Accordingly, the
court asserted that EPA could only give notice to the states after

139. See id. at 901 (noting U.S. House Reports state "legislation permits the
states to take lead in the enforcement of the hazardous wastes [sic] laws."); see also,
H.R. REP. 94-1491, at 24 (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6262 ("It is
the Committee's intention that the States are to have primary enforcement authority and if at any time State wishes to take over the hazardous waste program it is
permitted to do so.").
140. See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 900 (referring to "same force and effect" language found in § 6926(d) that refers to actions taken by states in hazardous waste
program).
141. See id. at 899-900 (arguing that heading "Effect of State permit" found in
section 6926(d) supports EPA position to overfile).
142. See id. (agreeing with district court's finding that "same force and effect"
encompasses RCRA enforcement mechanism).
143. See id. (observing that terms "any action" found in §6926(d) provision
was not limited to issuance of permits).
144. See id. at 899 (reviewing language of § 6828(a) (2) to reinforce role of
state government to take lead enforcement role). Section 6928 permits the EPA to
enforce hazardous waste law provided that it give states notice. Id.
145. See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 899 (interpreting § 6928(a) (2) to allow EPA enforcement action if written notice given to state). Section 6928 (a) (2) must be interpreted with Section 6926(b) providing that EPA may withdraw state
authorization if there is inadequate state action. Id. This gives the federal agency
a secondary role. Id.
146. See id. (asserting that EPA in certain circumstances under § 6926(b)
could withdraw state authorization if state enforcement inadequate).
147. See id.(asserting that under section 6928(a) (2), EPA may enact enforcement action after written notice given to state).
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first withdrawing authorization of a state program or to enforce a
48
state program if the state had not acted.
The court also noted that Congress did not intend to have
competing enforcement actions from the state and the federal
agency. 149 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that if Congress intended
the state and federal actions to compete with each other, the legislators would have used "and/or" in the statute rather than just stating "or" in the statute. 50 Additionally, if Congress intended to
have the federal agency duplicate a state enforcement action, this
intention would have been stated explicitly within the statute. 151
The Eighth Circuit upheld Harmon's preclusion argument,
holding that EPA's enforcement action against Harmon Industries
violated principles of res judicata. 15 2 EPA argued that the state
judgment had no bearing on the enforcement action against Harmon because elements of res judicata were present. 153 EPA also
argued that there was no res judicata effect to the consent decrees
15 4
issued by the state court.
The court referred to the four requirements of res judicata
under Missouri law to determine if preclusion would apply.' 55 The
first res judicata element was met because both MDNR and EPA
sued for the same thing, the enforcement of RCRA. 5 The identical cause of action created by both the MDNR and EPA met the
148.
action is
149.
EPA and

See id.(maintaining EPA may rescind authorization of state action if state
inadequate or state fails to initiate enforcement action).
See id. at 900-01 (reinforcing that state role is lead enforcer, not both
State competing for primary role to enforce RCRA).

150. See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 901 (citing language in § 6926 to give state primary enforcement rights over federal agency). The Eighth Circuit used a reverse
plain language argument to support their reasoning that if Congress intended to
allow competing enforcement action "and/or" would have been used in the statute
as opposed to "or". Id.
151. See id. (evaluating that Congress intended use of "or" in statutory language to prevent competing enforcement actions).
152. See id. at 902 (defining resjudicata as doctrine derived from Full Faith
and Credit Clause of Constitution, requiring that federal courts give preclusive
effect to state court judgments whenever state court would do same).
153. See id. (arguing resjudicata principals could not give state court consent
decree preclusive effect).
154. See id. at 900 (arguing that Congress provided right to bring enforcement action under RCRA).
155. See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 902. Missouri law requires the following elements for resjudicata: "(1) [i]dentity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the
cause of action; (3) identity of the persons and parties to the action; and (4) identity of the quality of the person for or against whom the claim is made." Id. (quoting Prentzler v. Schneider, 411 S.W.2d 135, 138 (Mo. 1966)).
156. See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 902 (referring to first element of resjudicata as
identity of thing being sued for).
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second resjudicata requirement.15 7 Finally, the fourth element was
met because MDNR and EPA both named Harmon as the defendant. 15 8 The only dispute, however, centered on whether the parties were identical under the third requirement of res judicata.159
The court referred to the statutory language of section 6926(b) and
6926(d) to find an identical relationship between MDNR and EPA
thereby fulfilling the third requirement of the res judicata
160
doctrine.
The Harmon court noted that a party is identical if the party is
one of the same parties that previously litigated the suit.' 6 1 An

identical party would also exist if the party were in privity with one
of the parties that previously litigated the former action. 16 2 The
Eighth Circuit found that privity between EPA and MDNR existed
63
because their relationship was nearly identical.
The Harmon court also reviewed the text of RCRA to find an
identical relationship between MDNR and EPA in their enforcement actions. 164 The Eighth Circuit referred to "in lieu of" language in section 6926(b) of RCRA and the "same force and effect"
language of section 6926(d) to find a privity relationship between
EPA and MDNR.165 The language was interpreted to mean that the
federal program operated "in lieu of' a state program and that the
state action had the "same force and effect" as an EPA action. 166
The court construed this language to find a privity relationship be-

157. See id. (acknowledging that second element of resjudicata is identity of

cause of action).
158. See id. (finding that identity of quality of person for or against whom
claim is made also was met).
159. See id. at 902-03 (referring to third element of res judicata under Missouri law as whether parties are identical).
160. See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 903 (resolving that relationship between United
States and State of Missouri were nearly identical in enforcement action based on
§ 6926(b) "in lieu of" language and § 6926(d) "same force and effect" language).
161. See id. at 902-03 (noting EPA and Missouri were not same party for privity
although previous case was based on same facts and legal principles).
162. See id. at 903 (finding EPA was not in privity with Missouri when case
previously litigated, but both EPA and state agency were in close relationship that
was nearly identical for privity).
163. See id. (relying on "in lieu of' language and "same force and effect" language in RCRA, to find nearly identical relationship).

164. See id. (explaining privity under Missouri law exists when two parties represent same legal right).

165. See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 903 (noting statutory language found in 42 U.S.C
§ 6926(b) and (d) to support interpretation that two parties stood in same relationship with each other).
166. See id. (finding state of Missouri advanced same legal right as EPA).
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tween the federal and state agencies. 167 Reasoning that a privity
relationship depended on the advancement of the same legal right,
the Eighth Circuit court found that Missouri advanced the same
legal right as the EPA under RCRA.168 Therefore, the court concluded that the doctrine of resjudicata barred EPA from overfiling
under RCRA. 169
V.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The Eighth Circuit's decision to prohibit overfiling under
RCRA is unsupported by subsequent case law.' 7 0 Since the Harmon
decision, courts in other circuits have declined to adopt the Harmon
analysis of RCRA overfiling. 7 1 These courts found the Eighth Circuit's conclusion prohibiting overfiling to rest on a flawed statutory
interpretation of RCRA and a narrow application of res judicata
principles. 172
A.

RCRA and Overfiling Powers: Statutory Analysis

The Eighth Circuit erred in its statutory analysis of RCRA when
it concluded that there was no support in the text or legislative history to allow overfiling.' 7 3 The Eighth Circuit analyzed the statutory language of RCRA, finding that EPA can only take
enforcement action if the state agency fails to take adequate ac167. See id. (agreeing with district court that privity is not based on subjective
interests of parties).
168. See id. (seeing interests of EPA and interests of state are not distinct).
169. See id. (ruling that pursuant to Missouri law, EPA must be bound by prior
judgments).
170. See United States v. Power Engg Co., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1059 (D.Colo.
2000) (declining to apply Harmon'sRCRA analysis), affd, 303F.3d 1232 (10th Cir.
2002); see also United States v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1092
(W.D. Wis. 2001) (finding Harmon decision to be unpersuasive reasoning to preclude overfiling tinder CAA and RCRA); United States v. LTV Steel Co., 118 F. Supp.
2d 827, 833 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (declining application of Harmon RCRA overfiling
analysis to EPA overfiling under CAA); United States v. Youngstown, 109 F. Supp. 2d
739, 740 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (refusing to apply Harmon overfiling reasoning to EPA
overfiling under CWA).
171. For a discussion of the subsequent case law declining Harmon application, see infra notes 82-116 and accompanying text.
172. See Murphy Oil, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1092 (stating that court was not persuaded by Eighth Circuit's decision to find RCRA statutory language and resjudicata precluded EPA from filing enforcement action tinder RCRA); see also Power
Eng', 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1059 (finding Eighth Circuit's decision to preclude
overfiling under RCRA incorrect).
173. See Coop, supra note 1, at 265 (contending Eighth Circuit's decision to
prohibit overfiling is not supported by text or legislative history).
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tion. 174 When analyzing the statutory construction of RCRA, the
Eighth Circuit should have given greater deference to EPA's interpretation under the Chevron standard of review. 175 The Harmon
court relied heavily on the plain language of the text rather than
reading the statute as a whole.' 76 Additionally, the Eighth Circuit
overlooked important policy considerations and the legislative his1 77
tory of RCRA when it concluded overfiling was impermissible.
The Eighth Circuit could have allowed overfiling practices
under RCRA had the court found that the statutory language of
RCRA was ambiguous and accordingly deferred to EPA's interpretation of the statute. 1 78 Under the Chevron statutory analysis, the statutory test requires interpretation as a whole, considering both
context and policy. 179 The Eighth Circuit gave little thought to
EPA's interpretation of RCRA, ignoring important policy considerations. 180 EPA interpreted the notice requirement under section
6928 as the only restriction to its enforcement authority under
RCRA.' 8 ' The EPA overfiles when states inadequately administer
174. See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 898-900 (referring to "in lieu of" and "same force
and effect" language in RCRA § 6926).
175. See Coop, supra note 1, at 265 (asserting Eighth Circuit's reading of "in
lieu of' and "same force and effect" disregarded policy considerations, text, and
legislative history favoring position of EPA); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (deferring to agency's interpretation
when Congress has charged agency to administer statute and statutory language is
ambiguous).
176. See Coop, supra note 1, at 265-66 (stating that impact of Eighth Circuit's
decision should be limited to RCRA because court relied too heavily on "elaborate" plain language interpretation of RCRA).
177. See id. at 267 (ignoring policy concerns in favor of pro-business interests
reflected in amicus briefs urging Eighth Circuit to affirm lower court ruling). The
Eighth Circuit did not refer to the Senate Report which provides support that Congress intended RCRA's division of EPA and state responsibilities to be similar to
CWA and CAA's provisions, allowing EPA to bring its own enforcement action. Id.
at 266.
178. See id. at 265 (pointing out that had Eighth Circuit considered policy
arguments and RCRA's entire legislative history, it would have deferred to EPA's
interpretation of statute).
179. See id. at 261 (referring to established rule of statutory interpretation to
consider plain language of statute examining as whole regarding "context, object,
and policy.").
180. See United States v. Power Eng' Co., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1061 (D. Colo.
2000) (asserting Eighth Circuit gave "short shrift" to EPA's interpretation of
RCRA).
181. See id. at 1061 (asserting EPA belief that only restriction to authority was
notice requirement from 40 C.F.R. § 271.16(c) and § 271.19). The Code of Federal Regulation reflects EPA's statutory interpretation of RCRA and its powers to
overfile. Id. at 1062. 40 C.F.R. § 271.19 reflects EPA's RCRA interpretation that
EPA has overfiling authority. Id. In addition, EPA's "Note" to section 271.16(c)
supports their interpretation that overfiling was permissible under RCRA. Id. at
1061. The "Note" was part of a settlement resulting from a lawsuit challenging
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environmental laws.18 2 Overfiling is a safeguard built into the federal environmental system to insure consistency and uniformity in
federal environmental enforcement.183 Allowing uniform enforcement of federal laws avoids a race to the bottom and protects states
from spill over pollution effects. 184 The Eighth Circuit's decision in
Harmon disregarded these policy concerns motivating EPA overfil18 5
ing practices when it dismissed EPA's interpretation of RCRA.
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado in
Power Engineeringanalyzed the Eighth Circuit's statutory interpretation of RCRA and found flaws in the Eighth Circuit's plain language analysis. 18 6 As Chief Justice Babcock asserted, "[w] ith all due
respect, I conclude that the Harmon decision incorrectly interprets
the RCRA."' 187 Lending support for the Colorado district court's
interpretation was the Tenth Circuit's decision to affirm the district
court decision and allow EPA overfiling under RCRA.1 88 The District Court of Colorado agreed with the Eighth Circuit's conclusion
that the notice requirement in section 6928 gave the states a primary role in enforcement under RCRA, however, it still allowed
EPA to file an enforcement action after giving notice to the
states.' 89 While the Power Engineeringdistrict court found that Congress intended for the states to have a lead role in enforcement, this

requirements and procedures for separate state permit programs authorized
under certain environmental statutes like the CWA and RCRA. Id.; see also 40
C.F.R. § 271.16(c) (2002) and 40 C.F.R. § 271.19 (2002).
182. See Zahren, supra note 8, at 419. States occasionally do not implement
federal environmental programs properly. Id. Accordingly, EPA overfiling isjustified in such circumstances. Id.
183. See id. at 420 (stating that federal enforcement keeps implementation of
delegated programs legitimate and federal standards ensure consistency and
uniformity).
184. See id. (noting some states weaken their standards or lessen enforcement
to induce polluting industries to invest in their states).
185. See Power Engg, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1062 (refusing to disregard regulations
found in 40 C.F.R §§ 271.16(c), 271.19, to determine EPA's interpretation of
RCRA and power to overfile).
186. See id. at 1057-61 (summarizing Eighth Circuit's interpretation of RCRA
and its analysis of "in lieu of" and "same force and effect" to preclude overfiling
under RCRA).
187. Id. at 1059 (disagreeing with Eighth Circuit's interpretation of statutory
language found in § 6926 and § 6928, finding textual analysis "superfluous").
188. See Power Eng&, 2002 WL 2017134, at *7 (10th Cir. Sept. 4, 2002) (affirming ruling of Colorado district court).
189. See Power Eng'g, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1059 (viewing EPA enforcement role
as secondary but still permitted to overfile so long as notice given to state).
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did not indicate that EPA was unable to overfile as the Harmon
court reasoned. 190
The District Court of Colorado found the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of "in lieu of' and the "same force and effect" language
questionable.' 9 1 In Harmon, the Eighth Circuit read section 6928
together with the "in lieu of' language of section 6926(b) and
"same force and effect" language. 192 Section 6926 addressed the
administration and enforcement of state regulations by authorized
states, while section 6928 concerned federal enforcement 93 The
Power Engineeringcourt disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's reasoning that the administration and enforcement of RCRA programs
were "inexorably intertwined.'" 9 4 Reviewing the plain language of
the statute, the District Court of Colorado, unlike the Eighth Circuit, found that the "in lieu of' language did not indicate that the
state regulatory programs supplanted federal regulatory programs
in all respects.1 9 5 The Colorado district court determined that the
"in lieu of' language contained in section 6926(b) suggested that
Congress did not intend this language to apply to federal enforcement actions, because of the chosen sentence structure in section
6926.196 The court found that the plain language of section
6926(b) "indicated that the 'in lieu of' appearing in the first clause
does not modify the second clause in which the question of enforcement is explicitly addressed."1 9 7 Based on this structural inter190. See id. (concluding § 6928(a) (2) notice requirement evinces primary

role of state enforcement under RCRA and allows EPA to initiate enforcement

action after giving notice); see also Zahren, supra note 8, at 402 (finding Congress

intended states to have primary role in enforcement but giving notice to states did
not preclude EPA from overfiling).
191. See Power Engg, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1059 (concluding Harmon court incorrectly interpreted statutory language of RCRA).
192. See id. at 1058 (reviewing Harmon court's holding which was based on
plain language analysis of RCRA).
193. See id. at 1059 (summarizing § 6926 and § 6928 and noting that structure

of RCRA suggests

administration and enforcement are not "inexorably

intertwined").
194. See id. (explaining that Harmon court reasoned § 6926 was inexorably intertwined with § 6928).
195. See id. at 1058-59 (finding plain language argument from Harmon unsupported and finding plain language of RCRA not indicating federal enforcement

authority supplanted by state authority in hazardous waste programs).
196. See Power Eng', 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1059 (referring to district court basing
its decision on structure of sentence containing "in lieu of" language in § 6926).
197. Id. at 1059-60 (interpreting "in lieu of" language and sentence structure
to evidence congressional intent); see also 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (2000) (noting state
"is authorized to carry out [its] such program in lieu of the Federal program under
this subchapter in such State and to issue and enforce permits for the storage,
treatment, or disposal of hazardous waste ....").
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pretation of the statute's text, the district court found that Congress

did not intend for the administration and enforcement under
RCRA to be "inexorably intertwined," and therefore did not ban
EPA from overfiling in enforcement actions. 198
In addition, the district court disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's analysis to conclude that the "same force and effect" language
found in the permit section of 6926(d) applied to enforcement actions under RCRA. 199 According to the Colorado district court, a
more apt interpretation would be to conclude that the "same force
and effect" language was intended by Congress to be restricted
solely to section 6926(d) state issued permits. 20 0 The PowerEngineering court suggested that the Eighth Circuit disregarded the heading
20 1 Usof section 6926(d), which is entitled "Effect of State permit."
ing this heading indicated that Congress intended to limit the lan20 2
guage "same force and effect" to the state permit process.
According to the Eighth Circuit, it was not the intent of Congress to
have such language apply to section 6928, which addressed EPA en20 3
forcement powers.
The Wisconsin court in Murphy Oil agreed with the Power Engineering decision and found flaws in Harmon's overfiling reasoning.2° 4 The Murphy Oil court, like the Power Engineeringcourt, did

not find enforcement and administration of state regulations to be
"inextricably intertwined."' 2 1 5 The Murphy Oil court determined
198. See Power Eng'g, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1059 (disagreeing with Eighth Circuit's interpretation that enforcement of environmental program by state or federal agency are "inexorably intertwined.").
199. See id. at 1060 (asserting that, "[t]he Harmon court's interpretation of
Section 6926(d) similarly rests on a flawed interpretation of Section 6926(b).").
200. See id. at 1060-61 (noting § 6926(d) relates to state issued permits and
that Congress intended to restrict "same force and effect" language to permitting
process).
201. See id. at 1060 (referring to INS v. Nat'l Ctr. For Immigrants' Rights, Inc.,
502 U.S. 183 (1991), where Supreme Court held that "the title of a statute or section can aid in resolving an ambiguity in the legislation's test.").
202. See id. at 1060 (noting that Congress intended to restrict 6926(d) to state
issued permits "otherwise there could be doubt as to whether the recipient of a
state permit also needs to obtain a permit from the EPA in accordance with Section 6925(a)").
203. See Power Eng'g, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1061 (maintaining that limiting "same
force and effect" language "gives effect to every word of the statute, and does not
necessitate 'harmonizing' Section 6928 by adding restrictions on the EPA's enforcement power not found in the plain language of that section.").
204. See United States v. Murphy Oil USA Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1116 (W.D.
Wis. 2001) (finding Eighth Circuit's RCRA interpretation unpersuasive, turning to
Power Engineeringcourt's interpretation of RCRA).
205. See id. (viewing Eighth Circuit's interpretation of "inextricably intertwined" as erroneously contrary to congressional intent).
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that Congress did not intend the state enforcement program to
supplant the federal program in all respects including enforcement. 20 6 In addition, the court supported EPA's interpretation of

RCRA when it found that the title "Effect of State permit" and the
phrase "same force and effect", appearing under the title limited
this language to state permits.

20 7

Therefore, the court disagreed

with the Eighth Circuit's interpretation that "same force and effect"
applied to any action taken by a state in a hazardous waste program. 20 8 The court referred to the legislative history in its interpretation of RCRA, and found nothing suggesting that Congress
precluded overfiling; rather the court read RCRA "as permitting independent [enforcement actions] by different sovereigns."' 20 9
Both the Wisconsin and Colorado courts found that the Eighth
Circuit misinterpreted the congressional intent of RCRA. 210 The
Eighth Circuit's decision to prohibit overfiling under RCRA overlooked the complete legislative history of the statute. 211 The Eighth
Circuit solely looked to the House Reports to conclude that Congress intended to limit federal enforcement power under RCRA. 21 2
Had the Eighth Circuit read the Senate Reports more closely, the
court would have noted that Congress intended to model RCRA
after sections of CAA and CWA, which allow enforcement actions in
the absence of appropriate state enforcement actions. 2 13

206. See id. at 1117 (referring to Eighth Circuits interpretation of language as

incongruous against legislative intent of permit holders).

207. See id. at 1116 (referring to Eighth Circuit's disregard for title leads to
misinterpretation of statute).
208. See id. ("This disregard for the heading undermines the [Eighth Circuit's] conclusion.").

209. Murphy Oil, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1117 (deferring to agency interpretation

to allow for separate state and federal actions).
210. See Power Engg, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1059-61 (maintaining that Harmon
court misinterpreted congressional intent behind § 6926 and § 6928 of RCRA); see
also Murphy Oi 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1116-17 (analyzing congressional intent behind
RCRA notice requirement in § 6928(a) (2) and language found in § 6926 (b) and
(d), disagreeing with Harmon's interpretation of that intent).
211. See Coop, supra note 1, at 265 (stating that Eighth Circuit failed to evaluate full legislative history and only looked at House Reports in analysis).
212. See Harmon Indus. v. Browner, 191 F. 3d 894, 901 (8th Cir. 1999) (looking
to House Reports to determine congressional intent of RCRA).
213. See Coop, supra note 1, at 269 (pointing out that Senate Reports indicate
RCRA sections like that of CWA and CAA regarding enforcement and both CWA
and CAA have allowed overfiling); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1342(h) (2000) (permitting
EPA to commence appropriate enforcement under CWA); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(a) (2) (c) (2000) (allowing EPA to bring own enforcement action under
CAA);.
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RCRA and Overfiling: Res Judicata Interpretation

While the Harmon decision significantly affects EPA's ability to
overfile, it is questionable whether other courts will agree with its
decision.2 14 The Eighth Circuit was able to find a privity relationship between EPA and MDNR based on principles of res judicata
under Missouri law. 2 15 The requirements of res judicata may be

different in other states, resulting in a different overfiling outcome
2 16
under RCRA and the other regulatory statutes.
The Harmon court relied on its statutory interpretation of
RCRA's text to find a privity relationship between EPA and
MDNR. 21 7 The Eighth Circuit interpreted RCRA to authorize the
state to proceed with its action "in lieu of" the federal government
and "with the same force and effect" as the federal government.2 18
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that a nearly identical relationship resulted when EPA authorized states to enforce federal environmental goals. 2 19 In other words, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that the
interests of the state and EPA were so closely aligned as to have an
220
identical relationship or privity relationship under Missouri law.

The Harmon court found a privity relationship between EPA and
the state during the authorization stage; however, existing precedent invalidates this reading of the Harmon facts under the doctrine
of resjudicata. 22' The Harmon court was the only authority finding
a privity relationship between EPA and a state agency in RCRA
22
overfiling enforcement actions
214. See Coop, supra note 1, at 270 (referring to limited value in other contexts due to Eighth Circuit's heavy reliance on plain language interpretation of

RCRA).
215. See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 902-03 (referring to Missouri law of resjudicata
to find privity).
216. See Coop, supra note 1, at 270 (stating state agency and EPA have been
found in privity in only one instance under Missouri law).
217. See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 903 (using statutory language of RCRA as guideline for party identity or privity analysis).
218. See id. (finding privity relationship from language found in § 6926 and
§ 6928 of RCRA).
219. See id. (finding privity when party is identical to party that has litigated
prior suit).
220. See id. (defining privity as relationship when two parties in two separate
suits have nearly identical, close relationship).
221. See United States v. Power Engg Co., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1065 (D. Colo.
2000) ("In my view the Harmon decision results in an unsupported expansion of
the doctrine of resjudicata ....
).
222. See id. at 1065-66 (inferring no authority supports finding EPA and state
agency in privity relationship actions for purposes of resjudicata when overfiling
under RCRA).
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The district court in Power Engineeringasserted that, "the Harmon decision results in an unsupported expansion of the doctrine
of res judicata as it is applied to the federal government under existing Supreme Court authority." 223 The Power Engineering court
also noted that the Eighth Circuit failed to cite existing authority
that found a close or privity relationship between EPA and state
enforcement actions. 224 Such a relationship would give a preclusive
225
effect to EPA's enforcement actions.
VI.

A.

IMPACT

The Effect of Harmon's Overfiling Reasoning Under RCRA

Our federal government's environmental regulatory scheme
has been widely criticized. 226 Much of the criticism stems from tensions between the state and federal enforcement of environmental
laws. 227 Ideally, the federal system strives to "strike[ ] a balance
between a desire for uniformity and an interest in promoting state
autonomy." 228 The inconsistent state and federal interpretation of
overfiling practices reinforces the strain between the state and fed22 9
eral enforcement systems.
The decision in Harmon v. Browner represents the difficulty of
balancing the responsibility between the state and federal govern230
It
ment when granting authorization of enforcement programs.
is foreseeable that the ruling from Harmon may be further narrowed under RCRA through subsequent overfiling litigation, as was
223. Id. (declining to apply resjudicata principles as Harmon had done when
state brings suit and federal government brings similar suit).
224. See id. at 1066 (quoting, "[t] he Harmon court failed to cite any authority

in which the federal government was deemed to have a 'laboring oar' on the basis
of a similar attenuated connection .... ).

225. See id. (failing to cite authority where privity relationship exists if EPA
grants state agency enforcement of EPA interests through state hazardous waste
program).
226. See Markell, supra note 37, at 1 (asserting that critics may seek to revamp
environmental regulations).
227. See id. (referring to government's approach to promoting compliance
with state and federal relations with regard to enforcement authority).
228. Id. at 36 (reconciling competing objectives of consistency in regulation

and state's independence to administer and enforce environmental laws).
229. See Zahren, supra note 8 at 416 (quoting, "overfiling does create tension
between the states and the federal government, but it is a tension that pushes both
sides to work for a more effective and efficient system without causing unnecessary
damage to the environment.").
230. See Coop, supra note 1, at 272 (explaining that there are difficulties de-

termining proper boundaries between state and federal systems' powers of enforcing environmental statutes).
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the case in the Western District of Wisconsin and the District Court
of Colorado.

B.

231

The Effect of Harmon's Overfiling Reasoning on CWA
and CAA
Although there is concern that Harmon's reasoning may affect

other federal environmental laws like CWA and CAA, the court's
interpretation to ban overfiling may be limited to RCRA and is unlikely to affect federal environmental statutes. 232 CWA and CAA are

similar to RCRA, however, there are differences in the text and language used in these statutes. 23 3 In all three regulatory schemes,
Congress intended the states to administer environmental programs and to have primary enforcement authority.2 34 CWA and
CAA, unlike RCRA, contain clearer language regarding federal enforcement action. 235 The court in Harmon relied on the statutory
language of "in lieu of' and "same force and effect" to ban EPA
overfiling and to find a privity relationship between the state and
23 6
federal enforcement action, which would preclude overfiling.
While this language is contained in the provisions of RCRA, CWA
and CAA do not contain such broad and ambiguous language in
2 37
their respective provisions.
CWA provides EPA with the authority to overfile and oversee
state actions. 23 8 Although states are to take a primary role in en231. See id. at 273 (quoting, "it is likely that EPA will strategically litigate in an
effort to narrow the holding of Harmon.
...
).
232. See id. at 270 (stating that "Harmon has the potential to affect EPA's enforcement authority under CWA and CAA."); see Coop, supra note 1, at 270 (finding statutory language in CWA and CAA to have differences from language in
RCRA, thereby limiting Harmon's interpretation of overfiling).
233. See Zahren, supra note 8, at 402. "RCRA more clearly states that the state
authorized hazardous waste program takes the place of the federal program. On
the other hand RCRA's enforcement provision reads similarly to the CAA enforcement provision leaving the question of overfiling fairly ambiguous." Id.
234. See id. at 401 (indicating that Congress's language in major environmental statutes, including CWA and CAA, makes states primary enforcers of regulatory
environmental programs).
235. See id. at 404. There are significant differences in language between
CWA, CAA and RCRA. Id. RCRA's use of "in lieu of" and "same force and effect"
language leads to ambiguity which neither CWA nor CAA uses. Id.
236. See Harmon Indus. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 899-902 (8th Cir. 1999) (providing that "in lieu of language" of § 6926(b) and "same force and effect" language
of § 6926(d) when read with notice requirement of § 6928 precluded overfiling
under RCRA contravening res judicata principles),
237. See Zahren, supra note 8, at 407 (describing CWA and CAA to have
clearer language than that found in RCRA; "therefore, they are not likely to undergo the same attack.").
238. See 33 U.S.C. § 13 1 9(a)(3) (2000).
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forcement, the federal agency's enforcement powers are not limited.2 39

CWA's enforcement provision, section 1319, discusses

unambiguously EPA's enforcement authority in a state with an approved enforcement program. 24° The statute maintains that EPA
shall act if the state has not commenced "appropriate" action. 24 1
The term "appropriate" allows EPA to determine when overfiling is
necessary to correct inappropriate or inadequate state action, even
where the state has taken enforcement action on a particular matter. 242 Further, section 1342(i) of the permit section provides that

nothing shall limit the authority of the Administrator to take action
pursuant to section 1319 of CWA. 243 Although EPA must provide
notice to the state under the CWA before bringing an enforcement
action, the statute does not prevent EPA from bringing an enforce244
ment action after a state action is underway.
Similarly, CAA endorses EPA overfiling to correct deficient
state actions. 245 The court in LTV Steel found that CAA contained
clear language in section 7413 that addressed enforcement actions
and allowed for overfiling. 246 Particularly, "in determining the
amount of any penalty to be assessed under this section ....the
Whenever on the basis of any information available to him the Administrator finds

that

any

person

is in

violation

of . . . [33

USC

§ 1311,1312,1316, 1317, 1318, 1328, or 1345] or is in violation of any permit condition or limitation implementing any of section in a permit issue
under . . .[33 USCS § 1342] by him or by a State or in a permit issued
under section . . .[33 USCS § 1344] by a State, he shall issue an order
requiring such person comply with such section or requirement, or he
shall bring a civil action in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
Id.; see also Zahren, supra note 8, at 405 (referring to language in enforcement
section, § 1319, to allow overfiling).
239. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(i). Federal enforcement not limited. Noting in this
section shall be construed to limit the authority of the Administrator to take action
pursuant to section 309 of this Act [33 USCS § 1319]. Id.
240. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1994) (establishing that if appropriate action
not taken by state, EPA may bring civil action or compliance order).
241. See Zahren, supra note 8, at 405 (citing to enforcement provision of CWA
to find that EPA's authority to overfile and oversee state actions under approved
programs is clear).
242. See id. (quoting, "the term 'appropriate' leaves the EPA with discretion to
decide when overfiling is necessary to correct inappropriate or inadequate state
action, even where the state has taken some enforcement action in a particular
matter.").
243. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(i) (referring to § 1319, enforcement section of
CWA).
244. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (setting out that EPA may commence civil action
or seek injunctive relief provided that notice given immediately to state).
245. See Zahren, supra note 8, at 405 (comparing similarities between CWA
and CAA in allowing EPA to overfile).
246. See United States v. LTV Steel Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 827, 833 (N.D. Ohio
2000). According to the LTV Steel court, the language found in section 7413(e)
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court [ ] shall take into consideration . .. payment previously assessed for the same violation." 247 According to the LTV Steel court,
this language found in section 7413(e) of CAA and implied that
Congress contemplated overfiling to be within EPA's enforcement
authority since such language would not be used if overfiling was
2 48
not permitted.
Similar to CWA, section 7413 allows EPA to bring a compliance
order, bring a civil action or issue penalties against violators of a SIP
or permit. 249 Although notice must be given to the states, this does
not limit EPA's enforcement authority. 250 Additionally, the permit
section of Title V allows EPA to impose sanctions on states with inadequate SIPS.251 Like CWA's permit section, CAA's section
7661a(e) provides that nothing shall limit the enforcement powers
2 52
of EPA to enforce permits issued by the States.
Courts have addressed application of Harmon to CAA and CWA
overfiling actions. The Northern District Court of Ohio declined to
adopt the reasoning in Harmon to prohibit overfiling for CWA en253
forcement actions in Youngstown and CAA violations in LTVSteeL
In Youngstown, the court referred to CWA statutory language to find
that the language of CWA explicitly provided for overfiling practices. 254 EPA filed an action after the state had done so pursuant to

maintains that overfiling was not barred, rather Congress anticipated such practices under the Act. Id.

247. Id. at 833 (quoting language in CAA that contemplates overfiling); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e) (2000) (allowing concurrent enforcement on state and
federal levels).
248. See LTV Steel, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 833 (lending further support that CAA
language did not ban overfiling practices noting that, "this statutory language
would have been unnecessary if once a violator paid a penalty to any enforcement
entity, it was immune from enforcement actions by any other sovereign.").
249. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (detailing civil judicial enforcement authority of
EPA).

250. See id. (providing that notice be given to state air pollution control
agency before bringing civil action).
251. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(e) (describing Federal Suspension Power); see also
Zahren, supra note 8, at 405-06 (describing EPA enforcement powers under Title V
of CAA).
252. See Zahren, supra note 8, at 405-06 (referring to SIP plan providing for
implementation and enforcement of NAAQS); see 42 U.S.C. 7661a(e) (1994).
"Nothing in this subsection should be construed to limit the Administrator's ability
to enforce permits issued by a State." Id.
253. See LTV Steel, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 827; see also United States v. Youngstown,
109 F. Supp. 2d 739, 739 (N.D. Ohio 2000). For a further discussion of subsequent
law, see supra notes 86-116 and accompanying text.
254. See Youngstown, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 741 (referring to language found in
§ 1342 and § 1319).
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violations of CWA. 255 The defendants relied on the Harmon overfiling analysis to argue that it was impermissible for EPA to overfile
under CWA. 256 The Youngstown court held that EPA filed its suit
pursuant to its authority under section 1319 and found that overfiling practices were permitted under CWA.2

57

According to the

Youngstown court, the language in CWA differed from the language
in RCRA and permitted overfiling practices.2 58 Similarly, in LTV
Steel, the same court refused to apply Harmon to overfiling actions
under CAA, finding that CAA contained clear language that addressed enforcement actions and allowed for overfiling. 25 9
More recently, the district court in Murphy Oil addressed the
Harmon analysis of overfiling as it pertained to CAA and principles
of resjudicata and found that the analysis should not be applied to
CAA enforcement action.2 60 The Murphy Oil court found that the
language relied on by the Harmon court to find overfiling practices
impermissible under RCRA was absent from CAA. 261 Like the LTV
Steel court, the Murphy Oil court noted that the language in section
7413 anticipated overfiling and allowed such actions. 2 62 Moreover,
unlike the district court in Harmon, this court did not find a privity
relationship between the state agency and EPA to preclude overfiling practices.2 6 3 The court found the Harmon res judicata argu264
ment unpersuasive.
255. See id. at 740 (noting that State of Ohio was also suing Youngstown for
violating NPDES permits issued to Youngstown by state agency).
256. See id. (maintaining that Youngstown placed exclusive reliance on Harmon interpretation of RCRA overfiling to argue against overfiling under CWA).
257. See id. at 741 (explaining "[t] he action against Youngstown was filed pursuant to USEPA's enforcement authority under § 309(b) and (d) [§ 1319(b) and

(d)] ....).
258. See id. (quoting "the language of CWA, on the other hand, compels the
opposite conclusion" when referring to language of "in lieu of" and "same force
and effect" language of RCRA).
259. See United States v. LTV Steel Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 827, 833 (N.D. Ohio

2000) (referring to language in CAA § 7413 that anticipates overfiling); see also 42
U.S.C. § 7413(e) (allowing concurrent enforcement on state and federal levels).
260. See United States v. Murphy Oil USA Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1091 (W.D.
Wis. 2001) (concluding that Harmon reasoning is inapplicable to enforcement action under CAA).

261. See id. (quoting "the act [is] devoid of language the Eighth Circuit
deemed important.").
262. See id. (relying on language of § 7413(e) which provides that Congress
anticipated overfiling actions when it provided in § 7413(e) that prior penalties
could be considered to determine new penalties).
263. See id. (refusing to be persuaded by Harmon reasoning that state agency is
in close working relationship to make them equivalent to same party for res
judicata).
264. See id. at 1091 (asserting conclusion of resjudicata precluding overfiling
ignores language of CAA).
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It is likely that the impact of the Harmon decision will be lim-

ited to RCRA.2 65 As reflected by the case law that has followed Har-

mon, the statutory argument against overfiling has been limited to
RCRA and has not been successfully argued under CWA or CAA. 266

A solution would be a Congressional revision of RCRA to describe
more clearly EPA's authority to overfile. 2 67 Perhaps language similar to language used in CWA and CAA should be used if RCRA is
revised. 268 Nevertheless, the issue of overfiling is clearly far from
269
settled.
Wendy R. Zeft
265. See Coop, supra note 1, at 273 (stating EPA will "strategically litigate" to
narrow Harmon holding).
266. For a discussion limiting Harmon's analysis to CWA and CAA, see supra
note 232-264 and accompanying text.
267. See Zahren, supra note 8, at 407 (noting that Congress may need to revise
language of enforcement provisions to describe EPA authority to overfile).
268. See Coop, supra note 1, at 270 (quoting that "CWA and the CAA contain
relatively clearer and much broader language than RCRA.").
269. See Zahren, supra note 8, at 407 (discussing future of judicial interpretation of overfiling under RCRA, CWA and CAA).
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